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Summary 
 
 For a long time Austria’s political system erected after WW II – the Second 
Republic – looked like the perfect embodiment of first highly unlikely but in the 
end successful democratization. From a current perspective was it a real success 
story and can it today serve as a model for other states aiming at democratic con-
solidation? Austria was a success story (though with some dark sides and ‘Leben-
slügen’) but this was due to non-reproducible beneficial external conditions and 
Austria’s geopolitical position. It can definitely not serve as a model case under 
different and unprecedented conditions. Moreover some of its earlier advantages 
and the inability to come to terms with it in a changed political environment are 
haunting Austria today. Besides problems like globalization it is upon those flaws 
that a rightist populist political force like the FPÖ can mobilize mass support and 
win elections. 
 
 For a long time Austria’s political system – the Second Republic – looked like the 
perfect embodiment of a highly unlikely but in the end a successful democratization. 
From the current perspective was it a real success story and can it today serve as a 
model for other states aiming at democratic consolidation? From my point of view 
Austria was a success story (with some dark sides and ‘Lebenslügen’) but due to the not 
reproducible beneficial external conditions and Austria’s specific geopolitical position. 
It can definitely not serve as a model case under the new and unprecedented conditions 
like those in Eastern and Southeastern Europe after 1989. Moreover, some of its earlier 
advantages and the inability to come to terms with it in a changed political environment 
are haunting Austria today.  
 After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, the weak and unstable First Republic – 
the unwanted rump state – was destroyed by internal political strife, the lack of belief in 
the existence of an Austrian nation and the absolute determination for territorial expan-
sion on the side of the Third Reich. Austria’s position was ambivalent in 1938: though 
occupied by German troops, quite a big portion of the population as well as the domes-
tic Nazi elite were welcoming the invaders and Austria became an inherent part of Nazi 
Germany which a year later started the war and was after its defeat occupied by the Al-
lied Powers. After the war Austria managed, however, to present itself as the first victim 
of Hitler’s territorial ambitions only and not also as its first volunteer.  
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 From 1945 to 1955 Austria was under the Allied occupation; in addition, the Cold 
War frontier ran through the country, dividing it into the Western and the Eastern part. 
After ten years, Austria not only managed to reunite but became the only European 
country that through a consensus of the Cold War powers gained independence and 
reached a negotiated retreat of Soviet troops.  
 Already at that time Austria was an exceptional case rather than a model both in 
relation to its past, its collective responsibility (if not guilt) as well as in relation to its 
geopolitical position. Unlike Germany, it overcame its territorial division; unlike its 
Eastern European neighbors, it avoided Sovietization – both likely scenarios at the time. 
Austria’s second chance for statehood was based on the Austrian State Treaty and the 
Declaration of Neutrality. Under these quite favorable circumstances Austria for the 
first time reached a nation-wide consensus about Austrian statehood – something lack-
ing with such dramatic results in the First Republic. If only to escape the camp of World 
War II’s losers – Germany and the Eastern European countries – this was a perfect op-
portunity to establish and popularize a notion of the belated Austrian nation, although 
only in defensive and reluctant terms.1 
 The external threats and support – the immediate neighborhood of some Warsaw 
Pact countries and Soviet invasionism on the one hand, the financial help of the Mar-
shall plan and the security promise of the NATO alliance on the other – contributed to 
the stabilization of the country and helped it find a safe place between the Cold War 
blocs, of use to both of them. 
 Without much democratic experience Austria quickly became a politically and eco-
nomically stable system also due to the establishment of a well functioning system of 
consociational democracy and its instruments – a state with a strong party system, even 
a party state. In the 1970s, Austria with about 30% of its adult population being party 
members, had one of the highest rates of party membership in the whole democratic 
Europe; more than 90 out of 100 voters cast their vote for one of the two major parties.2 
For 33 years (1945-66, and 1987-1999) grand coalitions between the Socialist 
Party/SPÖ and the Austrian People’s Party/ÖVP dominated the political arena and a 
corporatist regime with close cooperation between business and labor – known as Social 
Partnership – was installed. The parties not only controlled the recruitment within the 
political system but also in the banking sector, the state industry, the schools, the elec-
tronic media, etc. All these features contributed to the stability and conflict resolution 
before conflicts even came to the fore by means of before-hand reached consensus and 
power sharing arrangements at almost all levels of society. Especially in the 1970s when 
Austria was ruled by Socialist (minority, majority and small coalition) governments, 
political and social reforms were introduced which transformed Austria into a modern 
welfare state with economic growth, full employment and strong unions that never had 
to call for strikes and demonstrations.  
 
1 Ernst Bruckmüller, Österreichbewußtsein im Wandel. Identität und Selbstverständnis in den 90er 
Jahren, Wien, 1994, 15. 
2 Anton Pelinka, Parteien und Verbände, in: Emmerich Talos (ed.), Sozialpartnerschaft. Kontinuität und 
Wandel eines Modells, Wien, 1993, 71. 
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Term Federal Chancellor Composition of Government 
1945 
1945-1947  
1947-1953 
1953-1961 
1961-1964 
1964-1966 
1966-1970 
1970-1971 
1971-1983  
1983-1986  
1986-1987 
1987-1997 
1997-2000 
since 2000  
Karl Renner (SPÖ) 
Leopold Figl (ÖVP) 
Leopold Figl (ÖVP) 
Julius Raab (ÖVP) 
Alfons Gorbach (ÖVP) 
Josef Klaus (ÖVP) 
Josef Klaus (ÖVP) 
Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ) 
Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ) 
Fred Sinowatz (SPÖ) 
Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ) 
Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ) 
Viktor Klima (SPÖ) 
Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) 
Provisional government 
All party ÖVP/SPÖ/KPÖ government 
Grand coalition ÖVP/SPÖ 
Grand coalition ÖVP/SPÖ 
Grand coalition ÖVP/SPÖ 
Grand coalition ÖVP/SPÖ 
ÖVP majority government 
SPÖ minority government 
SPÖ majority government 
Small coalition SPÖ/FPÖ 
Small coalition SPÖ/FPÖ 
Grand coalition SPÖ/ÖVP 
Grand coalition SPÖ/ÖVP 
Small coalition ÖVP/FPÖ 
 Source: Table 3.4 Federal Chancellors and Governments in the Second Republic, in: Anton Pe-
linka, Austria. Out of the Shadow of the Past, Boulder/Colorado 1998, p. 60 (updated) 
 
 Over the last decade opportunities and barriers that shaped Austria’s internal as well 
as its international position altered dramatically. Austria’s middle(man) position be-
tween the East and the West (if we concentrate on its geographic and geopolitical posi-
tion) or at the edge of the Western world (if we focus on its economic system – market 
economy – and its political system – multiparty democracy) had to be redefined at a 
time when the Soviet bloc was no more and with it the political landscape in which 
Austria’s neutrality and non-alignment has made sense and contributed to its nation-
building efforts. The lifting of the Iron Curtain was enthusiastically welcomed from an 
ideological-normative point of view – the perspective of the once communist neighbor-
ing states turning into democratic societies – and the fact that a hermetically sealed 
frontier will become a “normal” border once again. But this positive evaluation did not 
last. Instead of the splendid isolation instability and competition were the ingredients of 
the new era. With the bloody war following the disintegration of Yugoslavia many 
refugees came to Austria, the now open former Eastern bloc borders were perceived as 
attracting cheap labor and crime and therefore threatening the so called ‘island of the 
blessed’. In addition, the transition process in the post communist states posed another 
challenge (menace if you put it more negatively, and this is what many Austrians did): 
these societies and their economies would compete with Austria in economic and politi-
cal terms. The fact that today most of them are already full NATO members or at least 
in the Partnership for Peace program as well as promising candidates for EU accession 
shows this assumption was not unfounded. Austria’s decision to join the EU in 1995, 
for decades a taboo issue, and the fact that in the end this decision met with an unex-
pected high approval of the citizenry of about 75 % could be seen in the post Cold War 
context and the desire for a more secure position within the new political order. Even 
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though the integration into the EU structures is a once-and-for-all settled issue and the 
integration in transatlantic security structures is still a taboo, fits into this scheme. Ac-
cession to the EU was seen as a game with Austria as the winning-it-all party (falsely, 
as Austria’s position as a net contributor to the EU’s budget as well as the short lived 
“EU sanctions” showed) whereas NATO accession is perceived as a costly affair (in 
terms of resources and responsibilities) while outside NATO Austria can enjoy all its 
security guarantees for free. 
 The external factors were not the only ones that led to the fundamental changes in 
Austria’s political system. Over the last few years, many features of consociational de-
mocracy came under heavy attack as no longer appropriate and a burden for a modern 
and modernizing society. The most important result of this criticism is the transforma-
tion of the political system that began in the second half of the 1980s – perhaps it was 
no coincidence that it was around that time that things started to change in Eastern 
Europe, too. It was in 1986 that the Green Party gained access to the parliament and the 
FPÖ under their new leader Jörg Haider re-positioned itself as a right-wing populist 
party including its proletarization, masculinization and rejuvenation when it comes to 
the electorate.3  
 A once dominant and in many ways hegemonic two-party system established on the 
basis of a two-camp mentality had to come to terms with its progressive de-legitimiza-
tion and the continual rise of a third major party – the Austrian Freedom Party/FPÖ. 
The Austrian Freedom Party was heir to a party that was formed by and for the former 
Austrian National Socialists (Verband der Unabhängigen/League of Independents). 
Apart from its rightist xenophobic and revisionist elements, it focused on the excessive 
influence of parties in Austria and the bureaucratic inflexibility of the social partnership 
system. It constantly tried to present itself as a new party or even not a party at all but a 
movement. In the late 90s it crossed out the term party and for a short period of time 
called itself F only.  
 The rise of the FPÖ is sometimes understood as an increase of pluralism of the party 
system, evidence of the normalization and in fact the Westernization of Austria’s politi-
cal system. Although the founding of the Green Party indicates a further diversification 
of the party system, the disproportionate gains of the FPÖ – 1986: 9.7 %, 1990: 16.6%, 
1994: 22.5 %, 1995: 21.9 %, 1999: 26.9 %4 – rather demonstrate the setting in which 
this pluralization and transforming of the political system takes place. It reveals the 
Austrian political system as one not used to pluralism, competition and open conflict at 
all and at the same time as inward-looking, defensive and at times full of resentment 
towards the outside world (take a look at the quite similar treatment of the Waldheim af-
fair and the EU sanctions by the political elite and the Austrian public). 
 Just as it was easy for nationalism to overtake the communist legacy in Eastern 
Europe, so it was for a nationalist, anti-modernist as well as anti-political party to fill 
 
3 Plasser, Fritz/Peter A. Ulram, Wandel der politischen Konfliktdynamik. Radikaler Rechtspopulismus in 
Österreich, in: Müller, Wolfgang C./Fritz Plasser und Peter A. Ulram 1995 (eds.), Wählerverhalten und 
Parteienwettbewerb. Analysen zur Nationalratswahl 1994, Wien, 1995, p. 485. 
4 Source: Official election results. 
 
Riegler, H., Austria – still the Second ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXVII, (2000), No. 5, pp. 116–121 120 
                                                                                                                                              
the power vacuum and take the lead in the long overdue transformation process in Aus-
tria. It speaks volumes that the only and lonely Liberal Party (Liberales Forum) – a fac-
tion from some liberal FPÖ members of parliament in 1993 – never managed to estab-
lish itself as a significant political grouping and was severely beaten at the polls. The 
Green Party as a single issue party with its concentration on the environment, human 
rights and pacifism gains at the expense of the Liberals’ decline, but neither have the 
power nor the stature to seriously challenge the flaws of the Austrian political system. 
 There are no special sectors of the society and the political system that need 
modernization and reforms. It is the political structure itself and its authoritarian under-
pinning in general that makes it difficult for institutions like the parliament, the judici-
ary or the media to work in an independent way so vital for a democratic system. Not 
only party but also the media concentration – the newspaper Die Neue Kronenzeitung is 
one of the newspapers with the biggest number of readers worldwide considering the 
size of the population and the lack of independent electronic media – while the state-
owned Austrian Broadcasting Company ORF, enjoying a broadcasting monopoly and 
with its board of trustees staffed by the political parties in power, has been a significant 
element of the Austrian political system. The traditional power-sharing between the two 
main parties and its hegemonic influence was once a stabilizing factor, but has been 
getting ever more dysfunctional under the conditions of competitive globalization with 
the new societal processes and interest groups emerging.  
 One example for the change going on recently might be the treatment of the core 
ÖVP and SPÖ interest groups like the pragmatized sector of state bureaucracy and the 
public transport workers whose consent was once so important for their respective 
party. Increasingly they have been let down in order to modernize both sectors. But 
apart from a half-hearted and quite technocratic reformist policy option that did not 
touch upon their influence in the (electronic) media or the appointments of public offi-
cials (judiciary, schools, universities, etc.), the grand coalition offered no conceptual vi-
sion of how to revitalize and modernize the Second Republic and had no guts to un-
compromisingly speak out against the rightist populist version the FPÖ favored. 
Whereas the Social Democrats tried to cope with the Freedomites by excluding them 
from any political pact but on the other hand giving in to many of their demands in a 
toned-down version (for example, in the migration and asylum-granting policy), the 
Conservatives oscillated between the declarations of the FPÖ as beyond the constitu-
tional order and at other times toying with the idea of a coalition.  
 After last fall’s general elections the People’s Party decided it was time to establish 
a new political order in which it could eventually take the lead. So for the first time 
since Jörg Haider headed the FPÖ (1986), a coalition with the FPÖ as the minor politi-
cal partner (although it has the same share of voters and seats in the parliament as the 
ÖVP) was accepted by an important segment of the political system. It was then that the 
perplexed Austrians had to learn that what to a majority of them seemed a perfectly 
normal political arrangement, the Austrian style, was judged by the leading European 
governments as a precedent with the potential of endangering democracy in the whole 
Europe. Although the so-called sanctions were rather symbolic and were felt above all 
on the representative political level, the government managed to present them to the 
public as the sanctions against Austria and its citizens. This successful mobilization led 
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to the closing of the ranks and the marginalization of the opposition voices, and eventu-
ally brought about the lifting of  sanctions (in the meantime assessed as counterproduc-
tive). Within the Austrian government the ÖVP was strengthened at the expense of the 
FPÖ (with also the public support for the FPÖ in decline – see various opinion polls and 
the quite heavy FPÖ losses at the provincial elections in Styria and the Burgenland). It 
is not clear whether it is the intent of the electorate to reward the ÖVP for domesticating 
the FPÖ or to punish the protest party FPÖ for their modest role in the government. 
 It remains to be seen in which ways the new coalition government will undertake the 
necessary reforms and whether it is going to avoid to fill in the grand coalition power 
vacuum with its own political allies and protégés. In this context the rise of the FPÖ to 
power should not be perceived as a heavy burden on the Austrian political system only. 
It reflects its shadows and its vagueness and this could have a catalytic effect as well. So 
we are definitely leaving for the Third Republic; it remains an open question whether 
the direction Austria has taken is liberal or illiberal. 
